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The debate over the legitimacy of judicial use of legisla-
tive history has significant legal and political ramifications
that have long sparked controversy. As additional commenta-
tors join this long-running engagement, the focus of the debate
necessarily changes.
In a previous article, John Manning argued that the use
of legislative history violates the constitutional rule barring
congressional self-delegation. Jonathan Siegel argues here that
judicial reliance on legislative history does not implicate that
rule, because a statute's legislative history already exists at the
time of the statute's passage, and statutory incorporation of
pre-existing materials operates as an adoption of those materi-
als, not as a delegation of legislative power. To illustrate this
point, Professor Siegel introduces, as a thought experiment, a
hypothetical Interpretation of Statutes Act. The Act provides
that the legislative history of every future statute will be auto-
matically incorporated into the statute, without express adop-
tion, and instructs courts to give customary weight to that in-
corporated legislative history. Siegel concludes that, because
legislatures are permitted to incorporate, by reference, pre-
enactment legislative history into statutes, such an Act would
be constitutional.
Disagreeing with that conclusion, Professor Manning re-
sponds that Siegel's Act would only formalize an unconstitu-
tional delegation of power. He argues that the resulting ar-
rangement-of the Act or of judicial reliance on legislative his-
tory-would allow members of Congress to subvert the aims of
bicameralism and presentment. He posits that the hypothetical
Act would effectively enable them to vote for a statute without
taking full responsibility for legislative history that resulted
from factional logrolling. This separation of the legislators'
responsibility from the legislative result (viz. statutory text),
Manning concludes, permits Congress to enact binding statu-
tory details through a process condemned by Supreme Court
jurisprudence because it is not prescribed by the Constitution.
In a brief reply, Professor Siegel argues that the hypo-
thetical Interpretation of Statutes Act would not allow law-
makers to evade responsibility, because Congress would still be
obligated to ratify agent-prepared legislative history when vot-
ing for each statute. Because of this chronology, Siegel con-
cludes, the Act would take legislative history out of the delega-
tion doctrine altogether.
